Trump may turn U.S. foreign policy and military planning upside down
As a political outsider who campaigned with venomous disdain for Washingtonβs national security establishment, Donald Trump appears likely to overhaul the nationβs military leadership, displace many of its top civilian advisers, and provoke turmoil inside the intelligence community.
If he keeps his campaign promises and secures the support of Republican lawmakers who will retain a majority next year in both houses on Capitol Hill, Trump will engineer a substantial increase in the defense budget to build more ships and planes, and enlarge the Army and the Marine Corps, fulfilling a long-held dream by those services and the contractors that support them.
Heβs also said he wants to double down on the Obama administrationβs multi-billion dollar investment in weapons systems designed to defend against attacking missiles, though these systems havenβt worked well in tests to date. And heβll accelerate Americaβs production of nuclear warheads, as well as the bombers, submarines, and ballistic missiles that carry them, despite worries among budget hawks that these agenda items are unaffordable in light of other pressing defense needs.
Trump has promised vaguely that he will pay for new military spending by βconducting a full audit of the Pentagon, eliminating incorrect payments, reducing duplicative bureaucracy, collecting unpaid taxes, and ending unwanted and unauthorized federal programs.β Weapons, he says, βcome in at costs that are so far above what they were supposed to be, because we donβt have people that know what theyβre doing.β (The Pentagon has been trying for years, so far unsuccessfully, to bring its accounting systems up toΒ modern standards.)
Itβs doubtful, though, that these proposed reforms will produce the billions of dollars in savings needed to fulfill the new presidentβs lofty ambitions. And while the Republican Partyβs platform has called for lifting a congressional cap on defense spending, the prospects are at best uncertain, since Democratic lawmakers have said they will go along only if the GOP agrees to commensurate increases in non-defense spending β which most Republicans still oppose. The Democrats will have the votes to filibuster new spending initiatives they donβt like, although some Republicans have threatened to alter the filibuster rules
Mass resignations follow any transfer of presidential power across party lines, but Trumpβs ascension to power β built in part on his βDrain the Swampβ campaign slogan β seems certain to provoke an exodus by those who have attached themselves to the Obama administrationβs big foreign policy goals. Among them: last yearβs international global climate change agreement; the controversial U.N.-backed deal to obstruct Iranβs acquisition of a nuclear arsenal; and pursuit of peaceful settlement in the Middle East that encompasses an independent Palestinian state.
Each of these initiatives could be pushed into a trash bin by Trump, if he keeps his word. Trump has called global climate change β a scientifically recognized phenomenon β an unproven foreign conspiracy, and one of Trumpβs national security advisory council members is Sen. James Inhofe D-Ok., a well-known climate warming denier. (Other members include the current chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations committee, Bob Corker, R-Tenn.; the chairman of the Senate strategic forces subcommittee, Jeff Sessions, R-Ala.; former Republican Attorney General John Ashcroft, and former CIA director Jim Woolsey.) During the campaign, Trump called the Iran nuclear deal βdisastrous,β but experts say itβs unclear whether he would scrap it outright. Trump likewise has said he plans to undo proscriptions on exceptionally brutal interrogation techniques for suspected terrorists, such as waterboarding β but it remains unclear how the CIA or the military would react if ordered to use such methods again.Trump’s relations with top intelligence officials are already poor, due to his rejection of their consensus opinion that Russia organized the hacking ofΒ emails involving Democratic party officials and operatives.
Those running the U.S. military campaign against ISIS are doubtless even less clear about what might lie ahead. Trump has promised a decisive military defeat of ISIS, but never detailed how he would do it differently than the Obama administration. Instead, heβs assured audiences that he understands the task better than the generals in charge.
U.S. allies in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East might be wise to start reviewing their out-year military spending plans, because Trump has also promised to short-circuit U.S. financial support for NATO, Saudi Arabia, Japan, and South Korea unless each starts ponying up more funds to pay for associated military costs. The U.S. share of total defense spending in Europe by all NATO members, for example, exceeds 70 percent, although some of this spending is for forces that can be used elsewhere in the world. Washingtonβs share of NATOβs direct budget (for its operations and staff) is far less β roughly 22 percent βΒ but still larger than anyone else’s.
At the third debate, Trump said, βWeβre defending other countries. We are spending a fortune doing it. They have the bargain of the centuryβ¦We have to renegotiate those agreements.β He went on: βSouth Korea, these are very rich, powerful countries. Saudi Arabia, nothing but money. We protect Saudi Arabia. Why arenβt they paying?β Actually, they do pay billions of dollars to reimburse some U.S. costs. But senior U.S. officials, including Obama himself, have repeatedly expressed identical frustrations; in April, Obama colorfully called such countries βfree riders,β virtually echoing Trump.
βAfter Iβm elected president,β Trump said in an April speech, βI willβ¦call for a summit with our NATO allies and a separate summit with our Asian allies. In these summits, we will not only discuss a rebalancing of financial commitments, butβ¦discuss how we can upgrade NATOβs outdated mission and structure, grown out of the Cold War to confront our shared challenges, including migration and Islamic terrorism.β
Mexico and China should similarly ready themselves for tough new negotiations over trade and immigration, two of Trumpβs signature issues. Mexicoβs president said during the campaign that his country would not finance completion of a nearly 2,000 mile long wall to halt immigration across the southern U.S. border, despite Trumpβs insistence that it could be forced to do so. Trump has also said he wants to renegotiate the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement, which paved the way for smoother trade with Mexico and Canada.
Will America be less safe in a Trump presidency? The Obama administrationβs nuclear arms deal with the Russians, the Republican partyβs platform says, has flimsy verification provisions and wrongly allows Russia βto build up its nuclear arsenal while reducing ours.β He has promised to modernize U.S. nuclear warheads β but it remains unclear whether or how his plan might differ from a modernization program already being aggressively pursued by the Obama administration.
Hillary Clinton accused Trump of being cavalier about a nuclear conflict, saying he had told Asian nations engaged in a nuclear competition, in effect, to βgo ahead, enjoy yourselves, folks.β In March, Trump said βmaybe itβs not so badβ¦if Japan had that nuclear threat.β He also said this is βgoing to happen whether we like it or not,β and that other countries such as South Korea and Saudi Arabia might also get the bomb unless the world gets βrid of them entirely.β But itβs unclear if this was a prediction or an endorsement, particularly when viewed alongside another remark by Trump last January that nuclear proliferation β including the seizure of a warhead by a madman β is βthe single biggest problem that our country faces right now.β
Much speculation about Trumpβs foreign policy has focused on how he will interact with Vladimir Putin. Trump has visited Moscow, where he tried to do some business, but he admitted during the second debate that βI know nothing about the inner workings of Russia.β From a distance, Trump has admired Putin for being βvery much of a leaderβ with substantial popularity. But Trump has an exaggerated sense of Putinβs return admiration, believing that Putin called him brilliant and a genius; actually Putin called him talented and used a Russian word correctly translated as βcolorfulβ or bold rather than brilliant.
βIf we got along well, that would be good,β Trump said of Putin at the third debate. He also has said, with an odd casualness, that βI donβt happen to like the systemβ in Russia, but he hasnβt acknowledged the systematic stifling of dissent under Putin, which led to street protests by tens of thousands of citizens between 2011 and 2013 (Putin has alleged that Clinton, while at the State Department, helped finance and stoke those demonstrations, giving him ample motive to try to subvert her campaign).
Some Trump confidants and campaign contributors do have ties to Moscow. A Russian-American businessman, Simon Grigorievich Kukes, who was installed as the head of the Yukos oil empire after Putinβs government ousted one of his critics, contributed more than $150,000 to Trumpβs campaign and a related joint fundraising committee, according to OpenSecrets.org, a nonpartisan group. A businessman who Trump identified earlier this year as a foreign policy adviser, Carter Page, has worked with state-owned Russian energy companies subsequently punished by U.S. sanctions β which Trump might want to lift. Moreover, Trumpβs campaign manager for four months this year, Paul Manafortβa longtime consultant to dictators and others of ill repute on the international stage βΒ resigned from his managerial post shortly after new Ukrainian documents surfaced that linked him to the political party of a Putin ally.
Two years ago, Trump said βwe should definitely do sanctionsβ in response to Russiaβs takeover of Crimea by military force, rather than annexation through peaceful political means. (The Russian militaryβs occupation preceded a pro-Russian vote by Crimeaβs population, representing a classic βrigged electionβ of the type Trump warned about at home.) But later, breaking with a broad consensus in Washington and allied European capitals, Trump said neutrally that βthe people of Crimeaβ¦would rather be with Russia than where they were. And you have to look at that.β He said his administration βwill be looking atβ lifting anti-Russian sanctions (which are currently slated to be renewed next month).
In short, the message Trumpβs voters have now sent to the rest of the world is βBrace yourselves. Itβs going to be quite a ride.β
